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Introduction 
For the international development community good governance has become the evident 
cure in the fight against widespread poverty. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) are one of the most important tools of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
the search to promote good governance. These papers are constructed by the 
governments of developing countries in cooperation with the IMF, and focus on the 
stimulation of development. A PRSP has to be: country driven, focused on results, long-
term, prioritised and orientated around social partnerships (Cheru, 2006, p. 356). 
 
In 2011 the Congolese government in association with the International Monetary Fund  
(IMF) prepared the second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP II). In 
the GPRSP II concrete plans were made to reduce poverty and increase economic 
development. The main goals were: large scale reforms in the agricultural sector, the 
countering of climate change and stimulation of economic growth. These plans were 
highly ambitious for a state where violence and instability were at the order of the day. 
PRSPs in general are always highly ambitious when it comes to the promotion of good 
governance, economic growth and reduction of poverty. But especially in relation to the 
above-mentioned conditions in the D.R. Congo, the question arose whether it was 
feasible to have such high expectations of the GPRSP II.  
 
The research question of this paper is: To what extent have the goals of good 
governance pursued by the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
in cooperation with international donors been achieved? The first section will focus on 
the general conceptual and theoretical framework behind the Good Governance agenda, 
Good Enough Governance and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The paper will 
continue with an overview on how the DRC evolved since it became independent in 
1960. The third chapter focuses on how national and international actors formulated 
and implemented good governance initiatives in the DRC. The fourth chapter will review 
if the initial targets have been reached. The final chapter provides an analysis of the 
effects of the good governance policies and possible improvements. In order to give a 
comprehensive explanation the following questions will be asked: How can we explain 
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the (lack of) effects? Have priorities been set, were feasible strategies designed? What 
are the main obstacles? What are other alternatives for the development of good 
governance in a post-conflict context? Is a focus on good enough governance a potential 
alternative? 
 
 The research goal is to provide policy makers with concrete and improved policy 
recommendations to increase the effectiveness of good governance measures in the 
DRC. This paper also aims, by using the DRC as a case study, to test and contribute to the 
conceptual framework of good enough governance by Merilee Grindle.  
1.Theoretical framework 
In order to present alternatives for the good governance agenda in the DRC this research 
paper will be based around the conceptual framework of good enough governance from 
Merilee Grindle. First, a definition of good governance will be given. Second, Grindle’s 
arguments against the conventional notion of good governance will be set out. The third 
part will elaborate on the debate around the good governance agenda, including the 
views of Adrian Leftwich. Finally, proposed alterations towards the design of good 
enough governance reforms are introduced.  
 
 In 1992 the WB published Governance and Development that set out the main elements 
that contribute to a definition of Good Governance. These are: 
 
“Inclusiveness and accountability established in three key areas: ‘selection, 
accountability and replacement of authorities (voice and accountability; stability 
and lack of violence); efficiency of institutions, regulations, resource management 
(regulatory framework; government effectiveness); respect for institutions, laws 
and interactions among players in civil society, business and politics (control of 
corruption; rule of law)” (Grindle, 2007, p. 14) (World Bank, 1992, pp. 1-69). 
 
 Good governance according to the WB implicitly encompasses nearly all aspects of a 
liberal western democracy. The indirect connection arises from the WB its prohibition 
to express preference for a particular regime type (Santiso, 2001, p. 5). With Good 
Governance the WB has managed to create a highly technocratic term that emphasizes 
efficiency and poses technical solutions to poverty instead of political ones (Leftwich, 
2000, p. 106). However it can be argued that with the normative shift from governance 
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to good governance the WB has taken a firmer stand by emphasizing the quality of 
governance (Santiso, 2001, p. 6).  
 
“Good Governance is a very good idea and people all around the world would have a 
much better life if all countries would have governments that follow the good 
governance agenda” (Grindle, 2010, p. 1). The problem of good governance is not the 
ideology itself; it is the fact that it cannot live up to all of the expectations (Grindle, 2010, 
p.1). The causes become clear in an article Grindle wrote in 2002.  One of the problems 
is the extensive amount of reforms imposed on third world countries. Decentralization, 
transparency, property rights improvement and increased participation from citizens 
are among the many reforms on the agenda (Grindle, 2002, pp. 31-36). The question the 
author poses is whether good governance isn’t too much of a burden on developing 
countries, since these governments do not possess the resources to make all these 
fundamental changes at once (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). Therefore development plans 
created by third world countries often lack concrete plans and remain very general 
(Grindle, 2002, pp. 5-7).   
 
Another problem with the good governance agenda is the lack of direct causality 
between governance and poverty reduction. The consequences of the proposed 
governance reforms are not clear in advance and can even have negative effects. This is 
often the case with decentralization measures, which can lead to increased inequality 
between regions instead of greater civil participation (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). Due to this 
lack of correlation between governance and direct and effective poverty reduction it is 
difficult for the developing countries to account for the reforms towards their 
population (Grindle, 2002, p. 5).  
 
The most pressing problem of the good governance agenda is the fact that it is 
ahistorical. The assumption that in order to achieve development a state has to engage 
in good governance has no historical foundation at all. Western countries initially 
experienced economic growth before there came a democratic transition (Grindle, 2002, 
p. 15). It is not realistic to expect developing countries to go through a reversed 
development then the West (Grindle, 2002, p. 15). Leftwich supports Grindle’s claim of 
the good governance agenda being ahistorical and adds that the term is also highly 
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technocratic. The WB and other international development organisations have managed 
to separate politics and development, while Leftwich claims that the two are inherently 
linked (Leftwich, 2001, p. 130). The dominant variable that shapes the conception of 
development and is capable of influencing its outcome is the politics of the concerning 
country (Leftwich, 2001, p. 4). Given the priority politics has in the success or failure of 
governance initiatives it is not the agenda that can transform development countries; 
this should come from the countries themselves (Leftwich, 2001, p. 154) 
 
According to Grindle there’s a general lack of country specific governance programmes.  
Thorough knowledge of the pre-existing dynamics within a country increases the chance 
of a successful intervention. Without this knowledge reforms may have a reversed effect 
(Grindle, 2002, p. 29).  Grindle argues that this is what happens when authoritarian 
regimes get well-meant support to improve governance but instead use this to increase 
control over the population (Grindle, 2007, p. 560). Furthermore the countries that 
indeed need the most extensive governance measures are the ones that possess the least 
amount of pre-existing institutions that can ensure correct implementation. More 
country-specific knowledge could decrease the amount of reforms proposed on these 
countries substantially (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). 
 
The abovementioned critique from Grindle on the conventional good governance agenda 
leads towards a proposed alternative of good enough governance. This encompasses the 
minimal amount of alternatives necessary to allow political and economic development 
(Grindle, 2007, p. 1). The following section will elaborate on the proposed alternatives 
concerning the good governance agenda that compose the concept of good enough 
governance. 
 
It is imperative to shift from making extensive bureaucratic changes towards a focus on 
poverty reduction. Many of the reforms proposed in development programmes such as 
PRSPs are to increase the capability of the state’s bureaucracy and have potentially only 
indirect effect on the reduction of poverty. These measures do not have priority, thus the 
extensive list of governance initiatives can be reduced substantially (Grindle, 2002, p. 
13). Grindle acknowledges that it is not always clear which measures will have the 
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desired effects on poverty reduction, however asking the question will provide better 
insights in the situation (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). 
 
When proposing governance reforms it is also important to have country specific 
measures that take all the domestic aspects into account. This also includes the history 
of the concerning country and the relationship between different groups in society 
(Grindle, 2002, p. 20).  
 
Another aspect that will improve the governance agenda is prioritising. This will ensure 
more in specified poverty reduction strategies that will have specific measures to target 
the issue (Grindle, 2002, p. 20). However it has to be taken into account that prioritising 
is evidently politics. Whenever choices are to be made conflict can occur. Conflict can 
function well in an arena in which there are multiple voices that are able to state their 
opinions, but will increase unrest if there is no level playing field (Grindle, 2002, p. 18).  
 
With the arguments Grindle portrays for good enough governance she attempts to show 
that there is no magic bullet for development. Development isn’t a decease that can be 
cured with the right medicine (Grindle, 2007, p. 572). The most important thing for 
governments is to empower the poorest with very specific measures and prioritise the 
required reforms to affect the population directly. There should no longer be this 
overarching programme of overly ambitious good governance measures that will not be 
implemented. And this is where the idea of good enough governance comes from 
(Grindle, 2004, pp. 14-15).  
2. The history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
If the effects of good governance are to be examined this should be done within the 
context of a country and therefore it is important to provide a brief overview concerning 
the political history and current situation within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
This research will concentrate on the time period right after the independence of the 
Congo. There will be a main focus on the changes in leadership, since this has been one 
of the prime causes of instability in the country.  
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The Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960 and after the first elections 
Joseph Kasavubu became the first president with Patrice Lumumba as the prime 
minister of the Republic Congo (Vanthemsche, 2012, p. 202). However due to different 
ideological points of view Lumumba lost his position (De Goede, 2015, p. 587). The 
Belgian and United States governments felt that Lumumba, who was a fierce nationalist 
with communist ideas, posed a serious threat to the current regime. There was a 
substantial fear that the country would fall into the grip of communism. Therefore 
Belgium and the US agreed on the need to replace Lumumba (Langer, 2014, p. 60).  This 
led to his assassination that was orchestrated by Kasavubu and his general Sese Seko 
Mobutu. The murder of Lumumba initiated the 1964-67 ‘Lumumbist’ rebellions, which 
were aimed against the government in Kinshasa (Jones, 2004, p. 239).  
 
In 1965 during the rebellions colonel Mobutu took over power with a military coup and 
renamed the country Zaire. Under Mobutu’s dictatorial regime, which lasted for more 
than 30 years, there was a period of relative peace and stability. However on the 
institutional and political level Mobutu managed to dissolve nearly all existing 
institutions and oppressed all opposition against him (Vanthemsche, 2012, p. 204). The 
Mobutu regime was known as one of the most corrupt regimes in the world, with 
patronage and bribery institutionalized in all aspects of the regime (Eriksen, 2009, p. 
654). Because of the fact that he was unable to control the patronage and keep it within 
his inner circle, it started to affect the work of government bureaucrats in a negative 
sense (Reno, 2006, p. 49). Due to this dissolving of the government bureaucracy the 
central government lost nearly all control over the local governments.  
 
Keeping Mobutu in power in order to have a western ally in Zaire was of more 
importance to the US during the Cold War, than the wellbeing of the citizens of the 
country (Reno, 2006, p. 50). However after the Cold War ended the western backing for 
Mobutu disappeared, leaving the dictator without the needed support. Rebellions broke 
out in 1996 and this marked the beginning of the first Congolese Civil War. When 
Mobutu fled the country in 1997 and was murdered Laurent-Désiré Kabila, aided by 
Rwanda and Uganda, declared himself the new president of Zaire (Erikson, 2009, p. 
656). This only lasted for a short period and the withdrawal of their military support 
was the beginning of the Second Congo War wherein Rwanda and Uganda sought to 
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overthrow Kabila and Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad that wanted to keep 
Kabila in power (Tamm, 2016, p.147). Due to the increasing violence the United Nations 
felt obliged to step in, also because of the fact that Rwanda was still fresh in their minds. 
In this light the United Nations Security Council approved a peacekeeping mission in the 
DRC in 1999. The UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) is one of the largest active missions of the UN and has been increasing in 
numbers substantially (Reynaert, 2011, p. 8). 
 
In 2001 Laurent Kabila was killed during a failed coup attempt (Mangu, 2003, p. 163). 
After his assassination Joseph Kabila, who was the son of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, 
succeeded his father. He has been in office ever since and has been recently accused of 
frustrating new elections to remain in power (Weiss, 2016). 
 
As proven through history the DRC has known a significant amount of instability. 
Continuing power struggles, extractive regimes and attempts at coups have made the 
government very weak and unequipped. There is no functioning government 
bureaucracy and also little to no control over the local governments. The ethnic division 
within the nation makes it nearly impossible to create a shared identity, making the DRC 
a deeply divided state. It is within this context that the implementation and execution of 
development programmes should be reviewed.  
3. Large development initiatives 
This chapter will focus on good governance reforms within large development initiatives 
in the DRC. The IMF and WB are the most important organisations in this field, and 
therefore the focus will be on these institutions. The good governance agenda is very 
extensive, so in this research the focus will lay on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 
the Tuungane project and the Great Lakes project of the World Bank.  
3.1 Second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
In 2011 the Congolese government in association with the International Monetary Fund 
prepared the second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP II). In the 
GPRSP II concrete plans are made to reduce poverty and increase economic 
development in the DRC. It is an overarching framework wherein pre-existing and new 
government initiatives are combined in order to increase development. The main goals 
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of the GPRSP II were: large-scale reforms in the agricultural sector, the countering of 
climate change, acceleration of the decentralization process, and stimulation of 
economic growth (GPRSP II, 2001, p.15).  
 
The first pillar of the GPRSP II focuses on the strengthening of governance and peace. 
This is to be achieved by reaching the following goals. First, the intervention capacity of 
the army and police to ensure national security has to be strengthened. Second, 
strengthening the political and democratic institutions (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 16). The final 
measure to strengthen governance and peace is the aim to accelerate the 
decentralisation process. This falls under strengthening of political and democratic 
institutions but will have a separate section due to the extensive measures that are 
being proposed. The Congolese government furthermore aims to promote the 
protection of human rights and intends to initiate a human rights awareness campaign.  
The aim is to increase public awareness concerning basic human rights among the 
population (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 53). Besides the awareness campaign the government 
furthermore urges that prisoners are treated in accordance with international human 
rights law. This is to be monitored by the department of Justice (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 53). 
3.1.1 Strengthening intervention capacity of army and police 
In order to create a stable state with territorial integrity the military and police are to be 
modernised. Therefore the overall institutional framework has to be improved and the 
capacity of army and police needs to increase with the help of additional funds (GRPSP 
II, 2011, p. 50). These funds will be utilised to professionalise the police force by 
increasing logistical capabilities, facilitate the retirement of soldiers, purchase improved 
equipment and improve the existing infrastructure (GPRSP II, pp. 50-51). The ultimate 
goal of these reforms is the creation of an apolitical well functioning police and army 
that can ensure the territorial integrity within the country. A central aspect in the 
strategy encompasses the training of police and military personnel to increase 
capabilities in the fight against rebel insurgents in the Eastern provinces (GPRSP II, 
2011, p. 51). The Congolese government acknowledges that these rebel groups in the 
Eastern Provinces are one of the main obstacles towards sustainable peace and 
development thus they invest heavily in increasing the capacity of the army and police. 
They further acknowledge that the presence of MONUC is of vital interest for the 
population given the lack of ability from the national forces to protect their civilians. 
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There have been several initiatives from MONUC to train military personnel and also the 
United Nations Development Programme has had a mission wherein they: 
 
 “Participated in the training and retraining of 3,527 police officers, the 
implementation of the first forensic unit in North Kivu, the reinforcement of the special 
police for the protection of women and children in North and South Kivu and in the 
creation of a legal aid centre;” (UNDP, 2016) 
 
Sexual violence is one of the most pressing problems in the DRC. In the Eastern 
Provinces rebel groups and also government police or military personnel are 
responsible for outbursts of violence against the population (Baaz and Verweijen, 2014, 
p. 803).  In response the government urges for the creation of a transparent framework 
to increase accountability structures for army and police as a measure against sexual 
violence portrayed towards the population (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 51). The government 
aims to reduce the violence caused by security forces by increasing living conditions for 
police officers, military personnel and their families (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 51).  
3.1.2 Strengthening of political and democratic institutions 
Increased citizen participation is vital for stronger democratic and political institutions. 
In the GPRSP II there are several articles that explain how this should be improved. 
 
Due to the decades of violence the population has learned how to survive without 
depending on public authorities, as a consequence they have a deep distrust for the 
government. This gap was filled by community organisations, making them the main 
organs in communities (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 84). These cross-sectional bodies, which have 
influence in all aspects of the community, are the tools that have to be used in order for 
the government to become more influential on the local level again. 
 Therefore the government will increase funding for community driven social and 
economic development plans. This will encompass a framework for consultation and 
partnership for the community organizations that will ensure their participation in the 
process (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 85). In accordance with the focus on community 
organizations article 335 elaborates on a more specific tool to increase citizen 
participation. Community Driven Reconstruction programmes (CDRs) are programmes 
that focus on improving infrastructure within a community while highlighting the 
importance of governance initiatives. The programmes are often implemented in areas 
that are affected by the aftermath of violent conflict; since they provide immediate cost-
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effective results that incorporate local desires and accountability (Kyamusugulwa et al., 
2014, p. 813). They function as a bridge between the government or an international 
donor and the community (Kyamusugulwa et al., 2014, p. 813).  
 
To assess whether CDRs are successful this paper will focus on the Tuungane project in 
the Eastern Province of the DRC. This project, which was active from 2007 to 2016, was 
funded by the UK government and implemented by the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC) and CARE International (Humphreys et al, 2012, p. 11). The project, which had a 
budget of 103.7 million GB pounds, funded and supported the construction and 
rehabilitation of 1700 classrooms and 150 medical clinics. Furthermore the project 
funded multiple infrastructure and livelihood plans in the communities (Humpreys et al, 
2012, p. 7). The main goal of the project was: “training, coupled with exposure to and 
practice in accountable governance in the context of these projects, can produce 
learning-by-doing and bring about change in local accountability and social cohesion as 
well as improve the welfare of communities. “ 
 
The full functionality of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) is 
among the proposed initiatives to strengthen the democratic process within the country. 
This organ has to ensure that elections will take place in accordance with the electoral 
agenda. This also includes the provincial elections that have already been delayed due to 
a lack of resources (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 49). 
3.1.3 Decentralization measures 
Article 148 shows that in order to accelerate the decentralization process the Strategic 
Framework for the Implementation of Decentralisation (CSMOD) has been created. This 
action plan focuses on effective ownership, progressive transfer of powers, capacity 
building, creation of management tools, harmonization of decentralisation processes, 
effective coordination between the government and local governments and finally the 
financing of the decentralization process (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 53). The CSMOD lays out 
concrete plans that will ensure the acceleration of the decentralisation process. The 
framework has been active since 2011 and has been updated regularly. The following 
elements come from the 2016 edition:  
- Creation of a governing structure change plan for decentralisation 
- Creation in 2011 of a partnership between the local and national governments 
- Approval of new laws stimulating the decentralisation process 
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- Approval of a strategic framework concerning the decentralisation process 
- Approval in 2012 of a national strategy concerning a transfer of capabilities and 
means to the provinces away from the central authority (CSMOD, 2016, p. 9). 
 
This is one of the few concrete action plans that have been created in order to establish a 
new political situation. Furthermore in 2006 the government of the DRC redistributed 
the country into 28 provinces. The main purpose of this reform was the transferred 
responsibility for tax collection from the central government to the provinces. The 
provincial elections of 2011 will determine the new terms for the transition of power 
and consolidate the new provinces (GPRSP II, 2011, p. 53). 
3.2 Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project 
The other major player, the WB, has 29 projects in the DRC with a budget of 3,8 billion 
US dollars. These projects have been divided into four sectors: infrastructure and 
sustainable development, human development, agriculture and private sector 
development and governance. Further attention will be given to the Regional Great 
Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project (RGLIADP). It is one of the major 
projects of the World Bank in the DRC and has a budget of 150 million US dollars. This is 
a project that spreads throughout the great lakes district in Sub Sahara Africa. The WB 
acknowledges that the situation concerning the postponed elections is troubling 
however they support the ruling president in order to tackle the root causes of conflict 
in the area; food insecurity and poverty (RGLIADP, 2016, p. 1) The main goals for this 
region are to increase agricultural productivity and commercialization and to improve 
regional integration, to provide immediate action in case of a crisis, enhance 
productivity, development of improved infrastructure in order to increase market 
access, improving the business environment and access to finance, create competitive 
market, regional cooperation and regional agricultural research (RGLIADP, 2016, p. 15). 
These goals are to be achieved by the development of agro-industrial parks, the creation 
of joint natural resource management programmes and an investment in capacity 
building and business environment (RGLIADP, 2016, pp. 20-21). When implementing 
new agricultural developments the community is incorporated in the process. This 
creates more community participation and opportunities to develop governance 
initiatives within the communities. The Great Lakes programme focuses besides 
agriculture on the incorporation of governance initiatives in implementing reforms  
(GLIADP, 2016, p. 22). 
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 It is seen as one of the most vital aspects within the country that can ensure agricultural 
development. To analyse potential effects it has to be kept in mind that the proposed 
initiatives are to be implemented in a country climate that poses a very high risk factor 
(GLIADP, 2016, p.ix). The philosophy of the WB includes that an increase in the 
agricultural productivity and the revenue received for agricultural products will 
decrease the tension between different communities and therefore increase peace and 
stability (RGLIADP, 2016, p. 6).  
4. Results large-scale development initiatives 
This chapter will focus on the results of the previously mentioned development 
programmes. First there will be a general overview of the achievements of the 
Congolese government in the field of governance. For this the World Wide Governance 
indicators (WGI) will be used. After this there will be a more detailed review of the 
results of the programmes. 
 
The data from 2011 and 2015 of the WGI will be used to see whether the GPRSP II has 
had an impact. The data ranks from 0 to 100, with 0 being the worst mark and 100 the 
best. Table 1 shows that improvement has been made, even though minimal. The 
country is still ranked as one of the worst in the world when looking at governance. 
When we also include the Human Development Index (HDI) as shown in table 2, there is 
an overall increase.  Over the period 2010-2015 the DRC rose four places, this gives the 
DRC rank 176 out of 188 countries worldwide (HDI, 2016).  
 
Table 1 World Governance Indicators 2011-2015 (WGI, 2016) 
 2011 2015 
Voice and Accountability 9 13 
Political stability and violence 3 4 
Government effectiveness 1 4 
Regulatory quality 4 6 
Rule of law 3 3 
Note: Adapted from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. 
Copyright 2017 by the World Bank Group. 
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Table 1 Human Development Index DRC 1990-2015 (HDI, 2016) 
1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0.356 0.331 0.398 0.407 0.412 0.419 0.425 0.435 
Note: adapted from http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD . Copyright 2016 
by United Nations Development Programme.  
4.1 Strengthening intervention capacity of army and police 
One of the main goals of the GPRSP II in the effort to improve governance was 
strengthening the capacity of the army and police due to the continued presence of rebel 
groups in the eastern Kivu provinces. State control is still very limited within these 
regions and there have been systematic outbursts of violence against the population. 
Human Rights Watch reported that since the beginning of 2015 armed groups have been 
responsible for the killing of over 860 people in the Eastern Provinces of the country 
(Human Rights Watch, 2016). In addition there have been reports that some of these 
killings have been planned and orchestrated by persons inside the military (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016).  
 
In 2013 from the 698 cases reported of sexual violence government officials were 
responsible for 31% against 69% inflicted by armed groups. In light of the proposed 
reforms concerning more accountability for police officers and military personnel 2014 
functioned as a landmark wherein 2 high ranked military officers have been sentenced 
to prison for 10 years and life. The military tribunal that was created after the GPRSP II 
convicted 135 individuals for sexual violence including 76 soldiers and 41 police officers 
(UN, 2015). Despite these new accountability measures sexual violence remains one of 
the most pressing problems in the DRC. The global peace index ranked the DRC 148th in 
2011 and 152nd in 2015 (Global Peace index, 2016).  Homicide index numbers show that 
the amount of homicides remains equal at 12,5 per 100.000 in 2011 and 2015 (UN, 
2015).  
 
When looking at the world governance indicators the political stability and absence of 
violence and terrorism remains a 4, meaning that there is very little control over the 
violence in the country. In 2016 the police and military in the DRC were even described 
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more as a threat to the citizens than as a protection (Englebert and Kusongo Mungongo, 
2016, p. 5).  
 
2016 also shows a rise in police violence against political opponents of president Kabila. 
The security forces are systematically deployed to intimidate, silence and repress the 
voices that call for new elections, this led to the arrest of more then 100 political 
opponents and their illegitimate detention (Human Rights Watch, 2016).  
 
The link between politics and the police can be traced back to the Mobutu era. Mobutu’s 
army functioned based on a system that was heavily shaped by networks of patron-
client ties (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2016, p. 805). And this legacy still is present in 
the army today. Combined with the increased participation of the police force in 
repressing political opponents it can be concluded that the main goal concerning police 
and army reform has not been achieved.  
 
4.2 Strengthening of political and democratic institutions 
Concerning the improvement of democratic institutions there have been troubling 
developments. In 2017 provincial elections haven’t been held despite the intention to 
hold these in 2011. In addition to the delayed provincial elections, the presidential 
election that was scheduled in 2016 has also been postponed until further notice. This 
worked as a trigger for a renewed upsurge in violence. This will deepen the division 
within the country and undermine development even more. The ethnic violence within 
the country also causes the geographic concentration of certain ethnic groups; this 
increases the already existing cleavages (Weiss, 2013, p.3).  
 
Opposition demonstrations and gatherings have been systematically banned or 
prohibited and the government uses the military and police to intimidate political 
opponents of Kabila (Haider, 2015, p. 5). Moïse Katumbi, one of the leading opposition 
opposition figures, was charged with the alleged recruitment of mercenaries and had to 
flee the country to escape prosecution (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The Bertelsmann 
Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) places the DRC in the category of hard-line 
autocracies along with countries such as Chad and the Republic Congo (BTI, 2016). This 
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shows that there has been no improvement in the strengthening of political and 
democratic institutions yet.  
 
The Freedomhouse indicators in table 3, which rank from 0 as the best to 7 as the worst, 
show that the DRC is not a free country (Freedomhouse, 2015).  
 
Table 3 Freedomhouse Indicators (Freedomhouse, 2011-2015) 
 2011 2015 
Freedom rating 6 6 
Civil Liberties  6 6 
Political Rights  6 6 
Note: adapted from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/congo-
democratic-republic-kinshasa. Copyright 2017 by Freedomhouse. 
 
The CDR project Tuungane was highly successful when it came to the implementation of 
proposed initiatives in compliance with local communities. However there has been 
very little enduring impact that has lead to structural changes in behaviour with regard 
to good governance. The technical changes, such as improving infrastructure, have 
proven to be highly successful however there is no indication that communities are 
receptive for alterations in their perspectives on governance (Humpreys et al., 2012, p. 
8). That the combination between technical and governance initiatives doesn’t always 
pays off is not only in the case of Tuungane. Research concerning the effects of CDR 
programmes also shows that substantial progress has been made in the reconstruction 
of infrastructure and other technical development initiatives but that there has been no 
lasting change in the socio-political attitudes and behaviour of the participants 
(Kyamusugulwa, 2016, p. 813). This problem derives from a lack of understanding of 
existing power structures within communities. These are based around very patrimonial 
and traditional relationships where participation is not guaranteed for all members of 
the concerning community (Kyamusugulwa, 2016, p.814). The CDR programmes don’t 
take existing accountability mechanisms into account and expect communities to shift to 
the new imposed ones without baring in mind the pre-existing conditions 
(Kyamusugulwa, 2016, p. 818). 
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4.3 Decentralization measures 
The 2006 reform of the provinces was supposed to be a major step in the 
decentralization process, however this has not yet occurred. Contrary to the 
expectations of international donors, the decentralization process in the DRC has only 
worsened the quality of governance (Englebert and Kusongo Mungongo, 2016, p. 6). 
Research shows that the main reason the government resists the implementation of the 
proposed decentralization measures is the potential loss of control over resources 
(Gaynor, 2016, p. 4). This also explains the overrepresentation of government officials 
from Kinshasa in the provinces and high positions within the civil service. This system 
revolves around an elaborate system of patronage in which the access to the wealth of 
the natural resources functions as the driving incentive (Gaynor, 2016 p. 5).  
 
Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo (2016) pose two main reasons for the failure of 
decentralization initiatives. First, there are formal and informal institutions within the 
country that coexist. With the reforms, the informal sector has not been taken into 
account, however this sector is not receptive for accountability and transparency 
measures that come with decentralization. Second, when implementing the new 
decentralization measures the current political situation and the history of former 
decentralization measures has not been taken into account (Englebert and Kasongo 
Mungongo, 2016, p. 7).  Within the DRC there are little to no accountability mechanisms 
due to the Mobutu era in which this has been dissolved. This makes it nearly impossible 
to make changes whenever there is no functioning organ that can control the 
implementation.  
 
The Ministry of Decentralization and Territorial Organisation, which was an institution 
created to oversee the correct implementation of new initiatives, was eliminated in 
2011 right after the GPRSP II was initiated. Instead of increasing accountability 
measures the Kabila administration got rid of the already existing ones. Another 
troubling development in 2013 was that the local and provincial elections were called 
off and postponed for an unknown time. These incidents support the notion of the 
increased autocratic character of the President (Weiss, 2013, p. 9).  Decentralization in 
the DRC has increased the amount of resources the government extracts from its 
citizens, by placing those close to Kabila in high positions at the provinces. Furthermore 
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it has increased provincial centralization at the cost of local communities, and thus has 
taken away power from the community organisations.  
4.4 Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Programme results 
In the latest status report from the WB the indicator progress towards achievements 
decreased from satisfactory towards moderately satisfactory.  In combination with a 
continued high security risk, the Great Lakes programme faces many challenges. Former 
secretary general of the United Nations Ban-Ki Moon and the special envoy for the Great 
Lakes project have expressed their concern for the diminishing of political freedoms in 
the DRC (Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo, 2016, p.10). This concern was fuelled by 
the attitude of the government facing the Great Lakes project. For instance, the RGLIADP 
has faced major opposition from the Kabila government when proposing alternative 
measures for the development of agriculture. The ministry of agriculture has not yet 
approved the adaptations to the programme that were suggested in 2016. This prevents 
the plans from being ratified. The financial Agreement was approved in parliament but 
the Ministry of Agriculture has not yet responded to the proposed alterations. Progress 
reports have been lacking the required data due to a failed duty of the Congolese 
government to provide the WB with the required information. The general lack of 
cooperation from the government is one of the main problems with the RGLIADP. 
Despite the troubled relationship between the WB and the government agricultural 
productivity has risen with 10% in the period between 2011 and 2016. This combined 
with a similar growth in food production shows promising developments in the 
agricultural sector despite government obstruction.  
5. Analysis results development programmes 
The previous chapter focused on the analysis of the results from the good governance 
development programmes in the DRC. There were four goals that have been reviewed. 
This chapter will incorporate the conceptual framework of good enough governance by 
Merilee Grindle in order to give a potential explanation for the failure of the good 
governance initiatives in the DRC.  
5.1 Strengthening intervention capacity of capacity army and police 
The previous chapter showed that there has been little to no improvement in increasing 
the capacity of the army and police. There remains a very strong reliability on the 
deployed MONUC forces that are present in the country. Instead of protecting civilians 
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Kabila uses the army and police to supress his political opponents (Human Rights 
Watch, 2016). Therefore strengthening the intervention capacity of army and police has 
proven to increase the power of the authoritarian regime. Grindle states that this 
happens when policymakers do not make country specific enough governance 
recommendations (Grindle, 2007, p. 662). As in this case the governance reforms in the 
DRC have only increased the authoritarian ruler’s control over the population.  
 
What becomes clear in the area of strengthening police and army capacity is the lack of 
accountability. Police officers and military personnel are not accountable when their 
actions are not in accordance with official laws. Despite the convictions of a number of 
government officials, there still are many outburst of violence against the own 
population that do not lead to the arrest of those responsible (DR CONGO: ADF & FDLR 
Violence, 2016, p. 21147). This leads to a deep distrust from the population towards 
their own security forces. The basic foundation of a social contract in which the state 
owns the monopoly over the use of force in exchange for the protection of its citizens is 
not present in the DRC (Doss, 2014, p. 731).  
 
The GRPSP II proposed extensive measures that would eventually lead to an apolitical 
army and police force. However the abovementioned phenomena do not show that there 
has been any success achieving this. Grindle states that this is a common problem with 
the good governance agenda. Developing countries are not capable of realising all the 
proposed reforms, given there were to many and there was to little capacity to achieve 
them (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). The recent developments in Kabila’s rule show that the 
president has no intention to decrease the interconnectedness between government and 
police. However, even if there would have been a serious attempt to reach an apolitical 
army and police force, the resources that have been attributed to achieving this weren’t 
sufficient. Increased training for police and military personnel is not the solution that 
addresses the root cause of the problem. A general lack of accountability mechanisms 
and control over police forces as a result of the Mobutu era undermines any attempt to 
increase capabilities of the security forces (Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo, 2016, 
p.5). Therefore it has not been realistic to aim at this apolitical national force for the 
DRC. 
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Increasing stability in the Eastern Provinces was meant to provide the population with 
an environment that would ensure more possibilities for development (Lake, 2017, p. 
282). However there is no direct correlation between increasing capacity of army and 
police and poverty reduction. And in light of the current situation in the DRC with more 
than 60% of the population living under the poverty line it would benefit the population 
more if the efforts that went towards the police would be redirected directly towards 
poverty reduction. 
5.2 Strengthening of political and democratic institutions 
In the period 2011-2015 no significant improvement has occurred in the democratic 
institutions of the DRC. It has even deteriorated due to the increased authoritarian rule 
of Kabila and his lack of regard for the country’s constitution. Despite efforts to create 
independent bodies to monitor judicial reform and free elections the government has 
actively interfered to undermine these reforms. When you have a nearly failed state as 
the DRC one may argue whether judicial reforms and independent election organs are 
the most important governance reforms. The population of the DRC is better off when 
the reforms focus on reducing poverty instead of extensive bureaucratic reforms 
(Grindle, 2002, p. 14).  
 
In general the support for government reforms is very low in countries where there is 
civil unrest, so the population doesn’t back the suggested initiatives (Grindle, 2002, p. 6). 
There is a lack of prioritising which results in a great amount of reforms that are not 
well formulated and very general (Grindle, 2002, p. 14). This critique is very much 
applicable to the DRC as well, and can explain why the democratic reforms have not 
been effective. The GPRSP II consists of a substantial amount of governance initiatives 
that are not formulated thoroughly. For a country that has one of the lowest HDI scores 
in the world, it can be far more effective to have reforms that purely focus on the 
reduction of poverty. This will provide aid where it is needed the most. When the 
population has access to basic human needs there is an opportunity to increase their 
participation. In the DRC where the influence from the Civil Society is very limited, the 
increased citizen participation can lead to more influence over the government. When 
social control over the government increases due to the Civil Society, there can be a 
country driven shift towards more governance. In this way governance reforms will 
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have effect because external donors do not force them on the government (Grindle, 
2002, p. 24).  
 
The Tuungane CDR project shows that external donors can contribute to the 
development of the country with technical projects that increase the livelihood of the 
population. The training that was supposed to increase the community awareness in the 
area of good governance showed that there is a discrepancy between the ideas of 
western organisations and local communities. Tuungane functions as an example of the 
general lack of knowledge organisations have concerning the pre-existing dynamics in 
countries that are subject to governance projects (Grindle, 2002 p. 29).  With Tuungane 
there has been a substantial amount of research in advance that focused on the country, 
however the pre-existing accountability mechanisms that were present in local 
communities should have been taken into account. If these mechanisms were 
incorporated in the action plan, greater success could have been achieved 
(Kyamusugulwa, 2016, p. 814) 
5.3 Decentralization measures 
The central authorities in Kinshasa have actively undermined decentralization 
measures. The proposed legislative changes concerning the distribution of provinces are 
one of the most evident examples of this obstruction. Decentralization as a governance 
measure is in general something that has not been without criticism. It can easily lead to 
increased inequality among regions and provinces (Grindle, 2002, p. 13). For a country 
that has to deal with deep ethnic divisions and ethnic based violence it seems that 
decentralization measures, with potential dividing consequences, are not at the top of 
the list. “Begin where the country is” is in fact the best way to start with governance 
initiatives (Grindle, 2002, p. 18).  Decentralization is not the cure for poverty; it only 
increases corruption when there is no functioning state (Grindle, 2002, p. 5). In the DRC 
this is certainly the case, so it is not feasible at all to implement decentralization 
measures. Because the country has to deal with continued civil unrest a different 
approach to the governance agenda has to be reached (Grindle, 2007, p. 563).  
 
It is imperative for policy makers to have thorough knowledge of the history of the 
concerning country. Proposing decentralization measures shows that this has not been 
the case in the DRC. The legacy of the Mobutu era is one of the main factors for the lack 
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of success of decentralization measures. During the 30 years Mobutu was in power, he 
managed to dissolve nearly all ties between the central government and local authorities 
(Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo, 2016, p.5) That this has not been taken into account 
is in line with the general critique of good governance’s lack of historical perspective 
(Leftwich, 2001, p. 130). When including these pre-existing conditions it is not said that 
this will mean that governance initiatives will have immediate effect, but it will increase 
chances of success. However the fact remains that the DRC has a very limited state 
capacity and needs substantial governance improvements. And in countries wherein 
governance is limited it is the most difficult to achieve this (Grindle, 2007, p. 572). 
  
5.4 Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Programme results 
From the analysis of the results it became clear that the government was not 
participating to the extent that was expected from the WB. Plans haven’t been reviewed 
or approved by the ministry of Agriculture. In this case it is not merely the fact that the 
government is not able to provide the necessary measures, because the WB arranges all 
the plans and provides the budget. There is a clear political unwill to continue 
cooperation in the Great Lakes project. However, agricultural development is an 
initiative that will have immediate influence on alleviating poverty. Grindle states that 
there are no magic bullets when it comes to governance reforms, but there are 
opportunities that can take countries in the right direction (Grindle, 2007, p. 572). Due 
to the aim of improved agriculture it will benefit the poor immediately and will 
contribute to poverty reduction. When looking at governance reforms there is a 
substantial amount of critique that is aimed against the international community, which 
states that it is too much for developing countries. But in the case of the DRC there is 
certainly also a government that plays an active role in the failure of implementing 
governance reforms (Tull, 2009, p. 219).  
The WB has to choose between supporting a known corrupt authoritarian leader in 
order for the agricultural programme to be implemented, or stop with the provision of 
donor funds for the Great Lakes programme despite the fact that this will leave the 
population in extreme poverty. This shows once more that when it comes to governance 
there is no recipe that will fix everything. It is a continued struggle between weighing 
costs and benefits of the proposed reforms (Grindle, 2007, p. 561). 
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Conclusion 
Governance initiatives in the DRC have not been successful, prioritised or realistic. They 
have been too extensive for a government with minimal control over the country and 
despite measures to increase the capacity of the army and police there has been no 
substantial improvement.  This has been caused by a lack of regard for the political 
context of the country.  
 
This research paper aimed to use the governance initiatives proposed in the DRC as a 
case study for the conceptual framework of good enough governance by Merilee Grindle. 
After analysing different governance initiatives this paper concludes that the critique 
from Grindle on the good governance agenda has been justified. In addition this paper 
aimed to make concrete policy recommendations for future governance initiatives in the 
D.R. Congo. Three concrete changes for future initiatives have been found. First, the 
amount of initiatives on the governance agenda has to be reduced substantially in order 
for more in specified planning. Second, the DRC is a country with very limited state 
capacity and a very high poverty rate. The focus of future initiatives has to lie in 
measures that directly increase living standards of the population. This includes 
programmes such as the RGLIADP and Tuungane. Finally, it is imperative that policy 
makers will make a thorough analysis of the consequences of proposed governance 
reforms. Strengthening the intervention capacity of army and police has proven to be a 
very bad measure. The increased capacity is used against the own population. 
Decentralization has proven to increase the inequality between the provinces and 
extraction of resources from the central government. Increased democratization is not 
realistic when a government, and especially the leader of the country, becomes more 
and more authoritarian and uses the security forces to supress its population.  
 
The DRC has a long way ahead towards developing into a stable country that 
experiences development. And since there’s no magic formula that can make this 
happen, it will remain a process of trial and error. For the international community it 
remains imperative to pressure the Kabila government to hold new elections and keep 
the sanctions in place as long as the government actively supresses its own citizens. And 
as Grindle states: “begin where the country is.” (Grindle, 2002, p. 18). This is the only  
way for the DRC to achieve sustainable development.  
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